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In Defence of Democracy: the Criminalisation of Impersonation 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract:  This article offers a philosophical justification for the criminalisation of 
voting as another person (impersonation or, in English law, personation) in public 
elections by arguing that it involves wrongdoing in the form of anti-democratic 
behaviour and that the failure to criminalise it will harm the public good of electoral 
integrity. With regard to harm, the article argues that the failure to criminalise 
impersonation will eventually result in widespread impersonation, such widespread 
impersonation undermining electoral integrity, itself instrumental to a number of public 
goods reflecting the democratic character of any given polity. Finally, the article 
completes the case for criminalisation by arguing that, in any given jurisdiction, it may 
be neither effective nor desirable for the entire burden of preventing impersonation to 
fall onto the civil law, with the result that the criminalisation of impersonation can serve 
a useful complementary role to the civil law in maintaining electoral integrity.    
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Introduction 
The act of impersonation, where a person votes as some other person, living, dead or 
fictitious, is a crime in many democratic jurisdictions.1 In the UK the offence, known as 
personation, is to be found in the Representation of the People Act, s. 60 (1983) (RPA 
1983), with the core offence to be found in RPA, s. 60(2)(a) (1983), as follows:  
 
(2) A person shall be deemed to be guilty of personation at a parliamentary or 
local government election if he— 
(a) votes in person or by post as some other person, whether as an elector or as 
proxy, and whether that other person is living or dead or is a fictitious person; ... 
 
This article will offer a theoretical and practical justification of the crime as defined by s 
60, with a view to providing a useful model for other jurisdictions. As for terminology, 
whilst the practice is commonly known as impersonation, since the analysis that follows 
focuses on the UK, the term personation as employed in English law will be used 
throughout the article.  
This article will argue that personation as defined by RPA, s. 60(2)(a) (1983) is 
worthy of criminalisation for two principal reasons: first because, as a form of anti-
democratic behaviour, it is wrongful and, second, because the failure to criminalise it 
will harm the public good of electoral integrity. It will then complete the case for 
criminalisation by demonstrating how the criminalisation of personation plays a 
                                                          
* The authors would like to thank Marc Stauch and the anonymous referees for their very helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 For example, India, see the Indian Penal Code, s. 171-D (1860); Australia, see the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act, s. 339 (1918); Ireland, see the Electoral Act 1992 s 134 with its similarity to the UK 
offence; and South Africa, see s 88(b) of the Electoral Act 1997.  The offences under s 88 are termed 
‘impersonation’ because the Republic has a much wider range of offences than the UK reflecting, 
perhaps, that country’s experience.  The situation in the USA is discussed throughout the article. 
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necessary, complementary role to the civil law of voting procedures so that the civil and 
criminal law work together in maintaining electoral integrity and, ultimately, a healthy 
democracy. 
Few if any of those committed to democracy would question the criminalisation of 
personation. It might therefore be asked whether its criminalisation needs explicit 
justification. One reason is theoretical neglect: unlike other crimes in the criminal 
calendar which have received extensive examination, personation, indeed electoral 
crime generally, has not been put under the theoretical microscope. There is therefore 
interest in deepening understanding of a crime whose criminal status is taken for 
granted.2 This is especially so since this examination involves fusing, in an 
unprecedented way, democratic theory with theories of criminalisation and, in so doing, 
revealing how the crime protects, in ways perhaps previously sensed but not fully 
understood, fundamental democratic values. A further reason explored in this article is 
topicality, in light of what appears to be a recent resurgence in the commission of the 
offence in the UK. At a time when attention in the UK may more frequently turn to the 
prosecution of personation, this article serves as a timely reminder of the important 
democratic values protected by the criminalisation of personation.  
However this article is more than a theoretical exercise: it is concerned with 
electoral integrity as a general matter and how the criminalisation of personation 
                                                          
2 In this regard this article follows a model whereby the nature of the wrongdoing is carefully 
distinguished from a potential harm it causes or may cause. Such an approach reflects the approaches 
adopted to rape and bribery in, respectively, “The Wrongness of Rape”, Chapter 1 in J. Gardner, Offences 
and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) and J. Horder, “Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing”, Law Quarterly Review 127 (2011): 
pp. 37-54. It is perhaps worth noting that Lindsay Farmer labels the identifying and understanding of 
wrongs independently of any harms they cause a “trope” of certain theorists’ view of the role of 
wrongdoing in criminalisation: see “Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective” in R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, 
S. E. Marshall, M. Renzo and V. Tadros (eds.), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) pp 214-237, p 223. It is submitted that it is a useful trope where personation is 
concerned. 
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integrates with the civil law to maintain it. In this vein, attention is drawn to the fact that 
matters of electoral law are sensitive, complex and may appear (wrongly, it is thought) 
to lack the impact upon the public of a number of more high profile crimes. That 
electoral law is often seen as esoteric is reflected in the fact that, in the UK, matters of 
election crime are dealt with by a special section of the Crown Prosecution Service 
(Special Crime), along with a range of other matters such as mercy killing, euthanasia, 
deaths in custody, corporate manslaughter and crimes allegedly committed by high 
profile public figures.3 In times of public austerity there may well be pressure to reduce 
the section’s workload by rendering electoral corruption a purely civil matter. In this 
vein, it is to be noted that the Law Commission is currently reviewing electoral law and 
it may be thought expedient to remove personation from the calendar of crimes.4 This 
may come as a recommendation from the Law Commission or it may appear in the 
forthcoming parliamentary Bill. This article provides a counterargument to any such 
move.5   
This article is therefore designed to draw attention to what is a serious, and, in the 
UK, an increasingly prevalent form of wrongdoing and, in so doing, expand 
understanding of electoral integrity, its relationship to democracy, and the mechanisms 
                                                          
3 See the Crown Prosecution Service website – Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division; 
Introduction to Special Crimes at http://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/sc_and_ctd.html#a04  
(site visited 25 March 2015). 
4 See http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/electoral-law.htm (site visited 11 February 2014). The 
matter is not raised in the latest Consultation; Electoral Law: A Joint Consultation Paper LCCP 218 
(London, TSO) but this is no guide to the future. 
5 It may be asked whether this would, in fact, happen. Unfortunately there are some tentative signs in the 
Law Commission’s latest consultation paper, ibid, that it might. As will become clear below personation 
(most) frequently occurs in the context of absent or postal voting. Whilst the Law Commission’s paper 
contains an entire chapter (Chapter 6) on the subject, most of the discussion focuses upon increasing the 
administrative burden on already overworked electoral officials and upon controlling the activities of 
party election workers in handling postal vote applications and even postal voting papers. Little if any, of 
the discussion concerns itself with the primary actors, the voters themselves, yet it is voters who commit 
personation. Here we therefore focus on potential primary wrongdoers.   
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that can, and should, be used to maintain both.6 It will begin by addressing an important 
preliminary point concerning the existence of a distinct crime in the form of 
personation; it will then summarise the various elements of the argument supporting 
criminalisation so as to give readers an overview, before proceeding to a deeper 
exploration of each of these elements.  
 
 
Why a Crime in the Form of Personation? 
Personation proscribes a form of behaviour, voting as another person that, as this article 
will demonstrate, embraces three different wrongs. These wrongs are multiple voting by a 
single individual eligible to vote once (‘multiple voting’), voting by those ineligible to 
vote and, finally, what this article shall term ‘pure personation’, whereby a person simply 
votes as another person without voting as himself or, alternatively, votes as another with 
the other’s permission, but the procedure for appointing a proxy or voting by post is not 
followed. The aim of this article is to explain why these wrongs are worthy of 
criminalisation.  
The criminalisation of pure personation raises a particular set of issues flowing from 
its status as a mala prohibita crime; for this reason, the justification of its criminalisation 
will be addressed in a discrete section at the end of the article. The article will therefore 
begin by addressing the criminalisation of multiple and ineligible voting, to which, for the 
sake of clarity, it will confine the expression ‘personation’. However, it should be noted 
                                                          
6 The authors are aware of the political controversy surrounding this matter in the USA and that the 
balance of academic opinion is that personation is a very rare event in the USA: see Alien Abduction and 
Voter Impersonation in the 2012 U.S. General Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment 
Ahlquist John S., Mayer Kenneth R., and Jackman Simon. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and 
Policy. -Not available-, ahead of print. doi:10.1089/elj.2013.0231. See also Comprehensive Database of 
US Voter Fraud Uncovers No Evidence That Photo ID Is Needed by Natasha Khan and Corbin Carson | 
News21Published Aug. 12, 2012 http://votingrights.news21.com/article/election-fraud/. See also L. C. 
Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud (Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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that both wrongs are also criminalised in the UK by s 61 RPA 83.7 This raises an 
important preliminary question that must be answered immediately: given the overlap with 
s 61, and similar provisions in other jurisdictions, why should these wrongs be conceived, 
targeted and perhaps prosecuted as forms of personation? The following reasons may be 
proffered.  
First, personation as a crime has the virtue of simplicity;8 rather than having to specify 
the necessary conditions, where multiple voting is concerned, of election and jurisdiction, 
and, where voting whilst ineligible is concerned, of eligibility, it targets in simple 
language behaviour that can be used to commit these wrongs; furthermore, it does so 
without risk of over and under-inclusiveness. Secondly, its execution, for example the 
registering of fictitious names on the electoral register, requires premeditation and 
organisation;9 when this is combined with the fact that personation involves disguising the 
fact of multiple voting or voting whilst ineligible, it reveals personation as entailing a 
particular kind of deception of the electoral system, making personation a distinct form of 
wrongdoing.10 Thirdly, it has the advantage of descriptive accuracy: as already noted, 
personation involves disguising multiple voting and voting by the ineligible and this fact, 
in combination with the mechanisms used to execute it, means that, as will be argued 
below, it is the only way to execute both wrongs strategically and on mass scale, arguably 
                                                          
7 Section 61(1) criminalises those who, in general terms, vote when subject to a legal incapacity in public 
elections. Section 61(2) and (3) criminalise those who, in general terms, vote more than once at public 
elections.  
8 Simplicity in this area may be a distinct advantage: the multitude of voting and voting-related offences 
created by, inter alia, ss 13D, 61 and 62A of the Representation of the People Act 1983 are extremely 
challenging to navigate.  
9 See Minnite, n. 6 above, who points out that voting as another (p. 7) and voting twice (p. 19) can happen 
by accident. The example of voting as another (‘…; John Smith Sr. on line number twelve in the poll 
book signs for John Smith Jr. on line thirteen and voila--another voter is ensnared in a fraud.’) and the 
example of voting more than once (‘…a confused voter who mails in a ballot and then shows up at the 
polls to vote again because he or she is not sure the mailed ballot got counted…’) can be addressed by the 
relevant crimes incorporating, expressly or impliedly as a matter of statutory interpretation, mens rea 
requirements that exempt non-culpable instances of voting as another or more than once. In other words, 
offences targeting such behaviour should not be conceived or interpreted as crimes of strict liability.   
10 See Minnite, ibid, p 26. 
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the most harmful manifestation of electoral fraud. In light of this, its existence as a 
separate crime allows the criminal law to label what has occurred in the most accurate 
way. Fourthly and finally, its existence leads to a rational division of labour with s 61 type 
offences, whereby s 61 and its ilk can be used to capture those who vote in their own name 
in violation of certain technical rules concerning jurisdiction, election or eligibility. Thus, 
for example, where voting more than once is concerned, s 61 can be used to catch people 
who attempt to vote in respect of more than one address in an electoral division or to vote 
by post as well as in person. This leaves s 60 to target those who seek to corrupt the 
system in a particular way, which is through voting by posing as another person.11  
Before proceeding it is also necessary to explain what personation is not. The plain 
words of s 60 criminalise voting as ‘some other person’ and, since the meaning of that 
phrase is not immediately apparent, this may lead to confusion. Thus s 60 may appear to 
say that a Mr Brown who decided to vote under an alternative name of his own creation, 
say, for example as a Mr Smith, would be caught by the provision.  This is not the 
meaning of s 60, as was made clear in Reg v Patrick Fox.12 Here one Patrick Fox seems to 
have become known for electoral purposes only as James Cummings. When he voted as 
James Cummings and was subsequently prosecuted, Hawkins J clarified the law by 
                                                          
11 Distinguishing between the two crimes introduces greater precision in our understanding of the concepts 
of voter and election fraud: see generally Minnite, ibid, Chapter 2 ‘What is Voter Fraud?’ where she argues 
that such precision is a necessary part of removing confusion in the empirical study of election fraud. It is 
worth noting that Minnite draws a distinction between voter fraud, which is exclusively concerned with the 
‘intentional, deceitful corruption of the electoral process by voters’ and election fraud, which includes voter 
fraud but extends to the ‘corruption committed by elected or election officials, candidates, party 
organizations, advocacy groups, or campaign workers…’ (p 36). The election petitions discussed in this 
article reveal that personation can extend beyond voter fraud into election fraud, whereas s 61 and its kind 
are examples of voter fraud. 
12 (1887) 16 Cox CC 166. This case was decided under s 24 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Elections 
Act 1872, which criminalises the act of applying for a ballot paper “in the name of some other person, 
whether that name be that of a person living, or dead, or of a fictitious person”.  This offence was re-enacted 
by Part 3 of Schedule 3 of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883.  This provision was 
repealed and re-enacted by the Representation of the People Act 1949 in Schedule 9 and s 47(2) respectively.  
The substance of these offences – i.e. voting or performing acts immediately preparatory to voting as some 
other person, living fictitious or dead, – has remained constant since 1872 despite the minor changes in 
language thus s 60 remains governed by the earlier case law.  See P. Gribble (ed) Schofield’s Election Law 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell. Updated tri-annually) para. 6.024 in further support of this view.   
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pointing out that the offence was voting as some other person, not voting under some 
other name. In this regard, Hawkins J stated: “A man, if he likes has a right to pass by two 
names.  … You cannot say a man personates another if, in point of fact, he is the very 
individual who has been placed on the register by the [Electoral Registration officer].”13 
Thus if an eligible voter called Peter Smith creates an alias for any purpose, even the 
exclusive purpose of voting in another name, and then votes under that assumed name, this 
will not be personation: the intention must be to vote as another person. Thus it is 
submitted that the reference to ‘a fictitious person’ under s 60 is a reference to those 
instances when the person uses the fictitious name to create the impression of an 
additional legitimate voter, a genuine ‘other person’, thereby concealing the fact that he is 
voting twice.  
Having hopefully justified the existence of the crime of personation in addition to s 
61, it is now possible to summarise the case for its criminalisation when it is used as a 
means to vote more than once or when ineligible. When this is completed the article will 
turn its attention to the criminalisation of pure personation. 
 
 
The Case for Criminalisation: a Summary 
The distinction between wrongdoing and the harm caused or risked by such wrongdoing 
is familiar to criminal law theorists. It is derived from a theory of criminalisation that 
conceives of both wrongdoing and a causal relationship between that wrongdoing and 
harm as necessary, and perhaps sufficient, conditions of criminalisation.14 The 
distinction provides an enlightening two-stage mode of analysis for existing and 
                                                          
13 Ibid 168. 
14 For an excellent discussion of the role of wrongdoing and harm in criminalisation, see generally A. P. 
Simester and A. von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms, and Wrongs: On the Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2011).   
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potential offences. First, the requirement that wrongdoing be demonstrated permits a 
deeper understanding of the conduct the criminal law seeks, or might seek, to prohibit;15 
secondly, demonstrating a link between the wrongdoing and harm serves not only 
partially to justify criminalisation, but also satisfies liberal constraints on over-
criminalisation.16 This article will subject personation to this two-stage mode of 
analysis.  
In order to understand the wrongfulness of personation it is necessary, as indicated 
above, to distinguish two sets of circumstances. In the first set, the personator is 
legitimately entitled to cast a vote in a given election but casts more than a single vote; 
in the second set, the personator is not entitled to vote in a given election but 
nevertheless casts a vote. Both sets involve wrongdoing because both involve behaviour 
that is fundamentally incompatible with democracy properly conceived. With the first 
set, this incompatibility resides in the personator’s violation of political equality 
amongst voters, a principle at the heart of democracy; here the wrongdoing consists of 
the personator illegitimately claiming, in a practical way, superior political status to her 
fellow voters. With the second set, the incompatibility emanates from the fact that 
democracies may legitimately impose certain restrictions on the right to vote, in the 
form of citizenship, competence and other eligibility criteria; here the wrongdoing 
consists of the personator exercising a legal right that she is legitimately denied by the 
electoral system.  
With regard to harm, the argument will take a particular form: it will be argued that 
personation is not worthy of criminalisation by dint of the direct harms instances of 
                                                          
15 ibid, in particular ch. 2.  
16 A classic account of the role harm can play in criminalisation is to be found in J. Feinberg, The Moral 
Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). For a 
perfectionist liberal account of the harm principle, see J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
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personation might cause, though the risk of such harms lends some weight to its 
criminalisation, but mainly because the failure to criminalise personation will eventually 
damage electoral integrity. Electoral integrity is worthy of protection because it is a 
“public good”. By “public”, it is meant a good shared by most, if not all, members of 
society. By “good”, it is meant that democracy requires electoral integrity, and 
democracy itself has a number of inherent and instrumental virtues that benefit 
society.17  
Finally, the case for criminalisation will be completed by arguing that civil 
measures and remedies are often insufficient to curtail the problem of personation, a 
situation made worse, in the UK, by the free availability of the postal vote. However it 
is also necessary to note that measures such as postal and electronic voting are designed 
to increase electoral participation and widen its social base, legitimate democratic 
goals.18 Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, perhaps most saliently the USA, there may 
be very good political and/or practical reasons for both widening voting mechanisms 
and for not making the barriers to registration and voting too onerous or complex.19 As a 
result, it will be argued that personation is a case where the civil law and the criminal 
law can work together harmoniously in the name of good societal governance. This is 
because measures such as postal voting, and generally the relaxing of administrative 
                                                          
17 See n. 86 below and corresponding text, where Joseph Raz’s definition of a public good is quoted. 
There is no conflict between Raz’s definition and the definition offered in the text. 
18 Remote electronic (or online voting) is not discussed in this article, in part because it is not currently 
used in the UK, a situation welcomed by the authors for the reasons set out in S. Birch and B. Watt, 
“Remote Electronic Voting: Free Fair and Secret?”, Political Quarterly 75(1) (2004): pp. 60-72. Readers 
might wish to note that Watt (in particular) argued that online voting and postal voting are in breach of 
Article 3 of the First Protocol ECHR. It is also worth noting that at least one very experienced judicial 
commentator takes the view that no innovation in voting methods will increase electoral participation, 
observing that “It’s not how you vote that brings out the voters. It’s the choices you are given.”  See 
Commissioner Mawrey in the Woking petition n. 9 below at [350]. 
19 See generally Minnite, n. 6 above, in particular pp 22-25. 
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barriers to registration and voting, increase the opportunities for personation.20 This 
exposes the difficult balancing act between increasing electoral participation and 
maintaining electoral integrity. The criminalisation of personation plays a key role in 
balancing these competing concerns by deterring those who, faced with the 
opportunities to personate presented by new voting methods, might otherwise be 
tempted to personate.  
An exploration of personation is not a merely theoretical exercise but, in view of 
widespread evidence of the commission of the crime in the UK, addresses a practical 
problem. This evidence includes four relatively recent election petitions concerning 
elections in Aston, Bordesley Green, Slough and Woking.21 The most recent of these 
petitions, in Woking, involved significant personation by a variety of means and 
arguably provides an example of the level of fraud currently afflicting many elections in 
the UK. Other recent evidence of personation is to be found in the Electoral 
Commission’s Analysis of Cases of Alleged Electoral Fraud in 2012, which reported 80 
cases of alleged personation concentrated in Tower Hamlets and Peterborough.22 It is 
also noteworthy that the famous violinist Nigel Kennedy admitted, somewhat blithely, 
that he had participated, although not as a principal, in personation in the 2010 General 
                                                          
20 Woking n. 9 below at [3]: “The introduction of postal voting on demand in 2001, however, laid the 
electoral system wide open to massive and well-organised fraud.” 
21 In the Matter of a Local Government Election for the Bordesley Green Ward of the Birmingham City 
Council held on 10 June 2004 and In the Matter of a Local Government Election for the Aston Ward of 
the Birmingham City Council held on 10 June 2004 [2005] All ER (D) 15 affirmed [2005] EWHC 2365.  
The Slough petition is reported as Simmons v Khan [2008] EWHC B4 (QB) and the Woking petition as In 
the Matter of the Representation of the People Act 1983 and in the Matter of a Local Government 
Election for the Maybury and Sheerwater Ward of the Woking Borough Council held on 3 May 2012 
between Mohammed Ali and Mohammed Bashir and Ray Morgan. EWHC M/336/12 (QB). The lack of a 
coherent modern series of election reports to replace O’Malley & Hardcastle (O’M & H) is to be 
regretted.   
22 Analysis of Cases of Alleged Electoral Fraud in 2012: Summary of Data Recorded by Police Forces.  
(London: Electoral Commission, 2013) 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/155336/Analysis-of-cases-of-
alleged-electoral-fraud-in-2012.pdf   (Site visited 17 February 2015)  
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Election.23 Further demonstration of the practical import of an exploration of 
personation is that the Law Commissions (of England and Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland) are co-operating in a major revision of the UK’s arguably outdated 
electoral laws, including electoral offences.24  Personation is thus within its purview, 
and an analysis and defence of this electoral offence will facilitate this review. 
 
 
Personation: The Violation of Political Equality 
As noted above, the first kind of wrongdoing involves the personator voting more than 
once in an election where he is eligible to vote on a single occasion. This is wrongful 
because it is a violation of the principle of “one person, one vote” (“OPOV”). OPOV 
requires that no individual can vote more than once in any given election,25 that any 
given vote is counted no more than once and, finally, that each individual vote is 
granted (more or less) the same weight as other votes.26 OPOV is the practical 
manifestation of what this article shall term, following Dahl, the “strong principle of 
equality”, a principle that is, as will be argued below, a key foundation of, and 
                                                          
23 Kennedy admitted that he had asked a friend to vote in the place of his absent wife, behaviour that is 
caught by RPA, s. 60(1) (1983), which criminalises those who aid, abet, counsel of procure personation as 
defined by s. 60(2).  Kennedy made this admission outside the period of limitation for prosecution for the 
offence, which is set at 12 months by RPA, s. 176 (1983); as a result, the police did not take further 
action: see http://www.hampsteadandkilburn.org/news/police-cannot-prosecute-kennedy-ballot-fraud  
(Site visited 11 February 2014). 
24 See n.3 above. There are a number of election laws which variously cover the UK.  The definition of 
these laws is set out in a number of places, the best being R. A. Watt, Reflections on a New Structure for 
the United Kingdom’s Electoral Law (London: Electoral Commission, 2013) par. 1.2.1-1.2.3.  The Report 
is available at 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/162178/Reflections-on-a-New-
Structure-for-the-UKs-Electoral-Law.pdf (Site visited 11 February 2014)  
25 The legal foundation of this rule is to be found in RPA, s. 1(2) and s. 61(2)(a) (1983).  The minor 
exceptions to this rule are discussed in Fox v Stirk 2 QB 463 (1970) and Hipperson v ERO Newbury 1 QB 
1060 (1985). 
26 It is sometimes thought that J. S. Mill was a proponent of plural voting, but close attention to his text 
reveals that he was prepared to tolerate it only as a short-term measure to overcome particular difficulties 
in the development of the franchise; see Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: 
Holt, 1890), pp. 170-175.  For a well thought out justification of plural voting in the form of a novel, see 
N. S. Norway (“Nevil Shute”), In the Wet (London: Vintage, 2000).  
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justification for, democracy.27 Thus to understand the wrongfulness of personation 
under these circumstances, it is necessary to explain the central role the strong principle 
of equality plays in democratic theory, and how OPOV emanates from it. 
Democracy as a political system is concerned with decision making in the context 
of national and local governance. It acknowledges that certain decisions of national and 
local governance will, in crude terms, favour the interests and preferences of some 
members of the community and ignore the interests and preferences of others. That this 
is so is a product of both limited resources, inevitably requiring the prioritisation of 
certain interests over others,28 and the fact of inevitable and pervasive disagreement 
amongst citizens on a wide range of policy issues.29 Democracy as a principle holds 
that, in light of this inevitable favouritism and disagreement, decisions relating to 
certain, though by no means all,30 issues of national and local governance are taken in 
the most just way, and hence justly imposed, when, in some form or another, members 
of the national or local community have been involved in the policy selection process.31  
The next questions are: why is the involvement of such members the most just way 
to make certain collective decisions, and in what form exactly? Dahl argues 
                                                          
27 See also R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1989), especially ch. 7, “Personal Autonomy”.  
28 On the question of limited resources (“scarcity”) meaning the interests of all cannot be satisfied 
equally, see T. Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 69-70. 
29 On the inevitability of disagreement on policy, see J. Finnis, “Natural Law: The Classical Tradition”, in 
J. Coleman and S. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-60, p. 23; T. Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic 
Authority and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 75-78 and The Rule of the Many 
ibid pp. 47-51 and C. R. Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 76-77. The necessity for governance in light of such 
disagreement is articulated by Finnis, 23 and Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, see n. 27 above, p. 83. 
30 For a discussion of the systemic (rights-based) constraints on policy selection see J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), especially p. 161 and pp. 240-241 and Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, revised ed. 1999), especially p. 201. Whether these 
substantive constraints on majoritarian rule are inherent to democracy properly conceived, or rather 
external to it, is beyond the scope of this article. For an argument that bases these substantive limitations 
on the notion of political equality itself, see generally Christiano, The Constitution of Equality ibid.  
31 Christiano, The Constitution of Equality ibid, pp. 95-96.  
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persuasively that the answer to these questions lies in what he terms the strong principle 
of equality: all appropriately qualified adults are sufficiently and equally well qualified 
to participate equally in making binding collective decisions that significantly affect 
their goods and interests, a principle that takes practical form as an equally weighted 
vote for all appropriately qualified adults.32 This principle is an amalgam of two further 
principles: the principle of equal consideration of interests and the principle of personal 
autonomy. How these two principles account for the strong principle will now be 
explained. 
The principle of equal consideration of interests is rooted in the moral notion that 
no adult’s interests are intrinsically more valuable than those of his or her fellow 
adults.33 At first blush, this fundamental notion of equality would appear to require that 
policy advance the interests of all equally – an equality of well-being. However, such a 
substantive definition, concerned as it is with outcomes as opposed to processes,34 
would seem to have nothing to say about the strong principle, itself concerned 
exclusively with processes. However, it will be argued below that the principle of equal 
consideration of interests should not be interpreted in this substantive way, as equality 
of well-being poses insurmountable problems of articulation and application. In turn, 
this rejection of a substantive definition exposes a procedural conception of equal 
consideration of interests, a conception that does play a role in justifying the democratic 
mode of decision making.   
                                                          
32 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, n. 27 above, ch. 7, “Personal Autonomy”. The authors have mildly 
altered Dahl’s definition by adding the word “equally” after “to participate”. It should be noted that the 
term “political equality” in the fullest sense of the term embraces more than the procedural equality 
entailed by the strong principle of equality: see text of n. 47 below for further discussion.  
33 Another formulation is offered by Christiano, The Rule of the Many, n. 28 above, p. 54: 2 “…advancing 
the interests of one person is as important as advancing the interests of any other person.”  
34 As stated by Christiano ibid 58: “Equal well-being can only be a general principle for evaluating the 
outcomes of political processes.” 
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In terms of its articulation, equality of well-being should be rejected because, as 
pointed out by Christiano, it is unintelligible as a political ideal.35 To summarise 
Christiano’s complex and subtle argument, there are three reasons to reject equal well-
being as a political principle: the first two concern the fact that persons’ conceptions of 
their own interests are, first, incomplete and, second, constantly evolving, so we lack the 
basic material with which to make comparisons of well-being; the third reason is that, 
even if we possessed such material, whether persons’ interests are actually met, and 
then met equally, would be “a matter of deep contestation”.36 To this may be added 
overarching and reasonable disagreement about what constitutes well-being in the first 
place, not least whether it is confined to the pure satisfaction of preferences, or includes 
certain objective values that might override preferences on occasion.37 Thus, as 
Christiano states, “[i]t would be absurd to evaluate political institutions on the basis of 
so unfathomable a standard.”38 
The above rejection of equal well-being exposes two difficulties with the principle: 
its essential contestability, and the fact that an individual’s conception of her own well-
being is liable to be mutable and evolving. Both of these difficulties would suggest that, 
within the political process, individuals themselves should retain governance over the 
articulation of their own interests. This latter claim receives further support when 
attention turns to certain practical difficulties should the pursuit of an individual’s well-
being be left to others, say bureaucrats. The danger here is that those bureaucrats may 
(eventually) lack the skill and/or virtue required to pursue the well-being of all those 
                                                          
35 Christiano’s argument is set out in The Rule of the Many ibid, ch. 2, “Equality” and also The 
Constitution of Equality, ch. 2, “Social Justice and Public Equality” and ch. 3, “Democracy as the Public 
Realisation of Equality”, n. 29 above. 
36 Christiano, The Rule of the Many ibid 66. See also Dahl, n. 14 above, pp. 87-88, especially p. 87 where 
he compares “person-regarding equality” with “lot-regarding equality”. 
37 See Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, n. 14 above, ch. 5, “A Critique of Guardianship”, especially, pp. 
65-72. See also Christiano, The Rule of the Many, n. 15 above, pp. 57-58. 
38 The Rule of the Many ibid p. 67. 
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they govern equally.39 Even if such skill and virtue could always be found in recruits, 
and maintained in those appointed to power, such bureaucrats would still need to 
ascertain, at regular intervals, the preferences and interests of those they governed as an 
empirical matter, a process that would be immensely complex, time consuming and 
expensive, and also liable to error.40 
These difficulties of articulation and implementation are addressed by the second 
principle embedded in the strong principle of political equality, which is the principle of 
personal autonomy. This principle states that each individual is the best judge of his or 
her own interests where individual and collective decisions are concerned.41 Thus no 
person is better qualified than the individual herself to judge what her preferences and 
interests are, and then to decide upon the policies that best reflect those preferences and 
interests.42 In turn, this exposes a procedural, as opposed to substantive, conception of 
equal consideration of interests, whereby the articulation by each individual of his or her 
interests is given the same weight as those of each and every other individual involved 
in a given policy selection process.43 
                                                          
39 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, n. 27 above, p. 76 and p. 103. See also Dahl, On Democracy (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 73-74, where the corrupting effect of power on a 
governing elite (guardians) is described.  
40 As A. Weale states: “Even good-natured persons have only a limited incentive to acquire information 
about the circumstances of others in conditions of bounded rationality.” Weale, Democracy (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd ed., 2007), p. 64. See too, Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, n. 29 above, 
p. 89. This idea is also reflected by Dahl: “The more that knowledge of A’s interests requires direct 
access to A’s awareness, the more advantageous is the position of A herself.”  Dahl, Democracy and Its 
Critics, n. 27 above, p. 102. 
41 As Dahl points out, this principle is a rule of prudence, by which he means a prudential mix of moral 
and empirical judgments: see Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, ibid p. 100.  
42 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, ibid 98. See also Weale, Democracy, n. 40 above, p. 64. In a system 
of representative democracy, the question of articulation of interests is performed indirectly, through the 
existence of political parties who formulate policy and voters then voting for the candidates of those 
political parties whose policies more or less reflect their interests as they see them. Such a system can be 
unjust in many ways, including failing to offer a sufficient range of choices: whether these potential 
injustices can and do undermine the strong principle of equality is a matter for another article.  
43 This approach may be contrasted with the proposals for “fancy franchises” considered in the British 
Parliament between 1867 and 1884, which gave extra votes to the wealthy and/or the educated; for a full 
account see C. Seymour, Electoral Reform in England and Wales (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1915). 
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Thus, when the principle of personal autonomy combines with the notion of equal 
consideration of interests, the strong principle of equality emerges, that all members of 
the relevant community are sufficiently and equally well qualified to participate equally 
in making collective decisions that affect his or her good or interest.44 This procedural 
vision of equality takes practical form as OPOV:45 each person should have an equal say 
in the selection of the policies and laws by which he or she is governed, in the form of 
an equal weighted vote as part of a democratic process.46  
The strong principle of equality provides a powerful and intrinsic justification for 
democracy because OPOV involves the state treating all members of the political 
community as deserving equal political influence, and therefore equal political status, in 
the system.47 Readers will now understand the wrongfulness of personation when the 
eligible voter votes more than once. Personation is wrong under such circumstances 
                                                          
44 Dahl, n. 27 above, p. 105. Though it is not necessary to resolve the issue for the purposes of this article, 
the authors believe this principle is political in the Rawlsian sense of the word, as opposed to 
metaphysical. It is also worth noting that in a system of representative democracy, the mode of 
participation is indirect, through the election of representatives and the fact of regular elections. However 
it should be noted that both the (non-binding) Art. 21(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the binding Article 25(a) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat direct and 
indirect democracies as equivalent and equally valid, provided they are conducted on the basis of 
“universal and equal suffrage” (present authors’ emphasis). The authors assert that Dahl’s arguments 
apply equally to the election of representative governments by universal and equal suffrage and direct 
democracies. 
45 As Dahl states, “voting equality at the decisive stage is necessary in order to provide adequate 
protection for the intrinsic equality of citizens and the Presumption of Personal Autonomy [author’s 
capitalisation].” n. 27 above, p. 109. 
46 It should be noted that OPOV also requires that, where elections combining votes from more than a 
single electoral district are concerned, those districts are roughly equally populated, so as to ensure the 
equal weight of each vote where the overall outcome is concerned. Such equality in the voting 
populations of electoral districts satisfies the quantitative dimension of the fairness of electoral 
procedures. Electoral fairness may also have a qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension, as the 
debate over gerrymandering reveals. For a discussion of the issues surrounding qualitative fairness, see 
Beitz, n. 29 above, ch. 7, “Fair Representation and Legislative Districting”.   
47 Political equality in the fullest sense of the concept can be defined as “equal resources to influence 
decisions regarding the collective properties of society”: see Christiano, The Rule of Many, n. 28 above, p. 
87. This fully realised conception of political equality is concerned with equal concrete power over 
decisions and therefore incorporates not only the equal procedural opportunity to influence decisions 
offered by OPOV but also the economic, social and educational resources whereby all can take advantage 
of that procedural opportunity. For discussion of these enabling resources, see, for example, A. 
Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 73; Beitz, Political Equality, n. 29 above, pp. 14-16; and Christiano, The Rule of the Many, n. 
28 above, pp. 89-90. Nevertheless OPOV and the principles it makes concrete are a fundamental part of 
the notion of political equality. 
18 
 
because it involves the personator illegitimately claiming superior political status over 
her fellow voters, in violation of the strong principle of equality and, ultimately, the 
concept of the equal political status of all citizens. This is because, in giving her voice 
greater voting weight by voting more than once, the personator is either claiming that 
her interests are deserving of greater consideration that those of her fellow citizens, in 
violation of equal consideration, or that she is a better judge of someone else’s interests 
and should therefore express this judgment on her behalf, in violation of personal 
autonomy.  
 
Personation: The Violation of Exclusion 
In the second set of circumstances articulated above, it was posited that personation is 
potentially wrongful when a person who is excluded from the franchise of any given 
election committed the act of personation. It was suggested that the wrongfulness of 
personation in these circumstances consisted of the personator’s violation of legitimate 
rules of exclusion from the franchise.  
In order to understand the wrongfulness of the violation of exclusion, it is necessary 
to explore the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita.48 Mala in se refers to 
those wrongs that can be largely identified and defined independently of the law: the 
law can then choose to reflect their existence through the creation of criminal and civil 
wrongs. Murder and rape are quintessential examples of such wrongs. Such wrongs 
should be contrasted with those wrongs, mala prohibita, whose existence is largely 
dependent on their articulation by the law, though they will ultimately be derived from a 
legitimate moral and/or administrative purpose. An example of such a wrong is the 
                                                          
48 For an excellent discussion of the nature of mala in se crimes, to which the authors are indebted, see 
Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, pp. 24-29.  
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violation of the rule that establishes which side of the road people must drive on: though 
there is no reason in morality to favour one side of the road over the other, once, in the 
name of road safety and societal co-ordination, a side has been chosen, it becomes 
wrongful to do the opposite. On occasion, the ex ante reasons for the creation of such 
wrongs allow for a range of reasonable choices, with the result that the precise 
formulation of the wrong chosen by the law will be somewhat arbitrary, a result 
justified by the organisational imperative to draw the line somewhere.  In such cases, 
the law makes determinate an abstract concern with safety or fairness or health or any 
other number of legitimate concerns of the state.  
Where the violation of political equality is concerned, its wrongfulness is pre-legal 
in the sense of mala in se, because that wrongfulness is articulated by a moral argument 
concerning political equality and the relationship between political equality and 
democracy. The wrongfulness of the violation of exclusion however is post-legal in the 
sense of mala prohibita: this is because, though the question of who should belong to 
the franchise is informed by morality, such that it can be morally wrong to exclude 
people from the franchise for certain kinds of reasons, different systems can 
nevertheless draw the line in different places without injustice, for example electoral 
systems that carve out different eligibility criteria where age and competence are 
concerned. Such differences may be informed by a wide range of moral, practical and 
cultural concerns, for example, a nation may decide selectively to lower the age of 
eligibility for those who have served in the armed forces.49 However, once an electoral 
system has drawn the line in a reasonable way, violating that rule is wrongful.50   
                                                          
49 An historical example is when the voting age was set at 21 for males by the Representation of the 
People Act, s. 1(1) (1918), reflecting a common law view of the age of majority, save for those who had 
undertaken military service, in which case s. 5 set a younger age of 19. This reflected the view, certainly 
defensible in its historical context that, if one is old enough to die for one’s country, one is old enough to 
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Mala prohibita crimes might raise concerns with any theorist who believes that a 
necessary condition of criminalisation is that the conduct concerned is morally wrongful 
prior to criminalisation.51 Antony Duff has suggested that mala prohibita crimes do in 
fact satisfy this condition, so long as the conduct is wrong prior to criminalisation, 
though not wrong prior to legal regulation by the civil law.52 In the case of eligibility 
requirements for voting, this is almost universally the case.53 However it is not clear that 
the legitimate criminalisation of mala prohibita crimes should require pre-
criminalisation, civil law wrongfulness: if the conduct becomes wrongful once the law 
has declared it to be so, it should not matter that, on occasion, it is exclusively the 
criminal law that makes that declaration. What is of the essence is whether, exclusively 
or in conjunction with the civil law, the articulation of that conduct as wrongful by the 
criminal law is justified.54  
Where eligibility requirements for the franchise are concerned, it is submitted that 
that is the case when those eligibility requirements reflect, in a reasonable and 
proportionate way, important values concerning capacity and commitment to the 
polity.55 It is for this reason that personating in order to overcome unjust exclusions 
from the franchise, for example those based on race, would be morally justified, and its 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
vote for the government. This reflects the notion that inclusion in the franchise is partly dependent on the 
demonstration of commitment to the polity/nation, a notion discussed in the text above.   
50 Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, pp. 24-29; see also Minnite, n. 9 above, pp. 32-35. 
51 This is a particular branch of what is commonly known as legal moralism. 
52 Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007), pp 
91-92. See also “Perversions and Subversions of Criminal Law” in RA Duff, L Farmer, SE Marshall, M 
Renzo and V Tadros (eds.), The Boundaries of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)  
88, 94-95.  
53 The rules governing eligibility to vote and inclusion in the Electoral Registers (the Parliamentary and 
Local Government Registers differing slightly in ways which do not affect or argument) are to be found in 
the Representation of the People Act 1983, substantially in ss 1-7C.  
54 For a similar argument, see Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, pp. 24-29.  
55 Of course the complete case for criminalisation also turns on questions of harm, questions which this 
article will address below. The overall conclusion is that criminalisation of personation is justified 
because there is a powerful social need for regulation in the name of the common good, and the deterrent 
effect of the criminal law is required.  
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prohibition by the law in such cases could not make it wrongful in any sense.56 Thus 
when an electoral system excludes people from the franchise illegitimately, such unjust 
exclusions are fatal to the criminalisation of personation by those unjustly excluded. 
Therefore, to summarise, whether personation is wrongful when committed by the 
excluded depends, in large part, on the equity and reasonableness of any given 
jurisdiction’s rules of exclusion. This article will examine the situation in the UK in 
order to illustrate this mode of analysis. 
Such an analysis must begin with a principle of inclusion against which the rules of 
exclusion can be evaluated. In light of the commitment to the principle of political 
equality and democracy, as opposed to any alternative political arrangement, 
Schumpeter’s proposal that it is just for the members of any given polity to decide, 
without restriction, who is admitted to the franchise is rejected.57 This is a clear 
violation of the principle of political equality and is in contravention of almost two 
hundred years of struggle in the United Kingdom to extend the franchise to almost all 
adult members of the population.58 At the other extreme is Dahl’s proposal that all 
adults subject to the laws of a polity should be enfranchised, a generous test of inclusion 
that this article will use as a starting point.59 It will be argued that Dahl’s requirement of 
being an adult subject to the laws of the polity should be narrowed by a further 
                                                          
56 Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, p. 25 “...doing does not become (morally) wrong just because the 
state declares it to be so.” 
57 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 245. 
58 See G. D. H. Cole, British Working Class Politics 1832-1914 (London: Routledge, 1941); E. S. 
Pankhurst, The Suffragette Movement (London: Virago, 1977); Seymour above n. 31 and, for a short 
summary of the major developments from 1430 to 2000, B. Watt, UK Election Law: a Critical 
Examination (London: Glasshouse, 2006), pp. 34-48. 
59 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, see n. 27 above. 
22 
 
necessary condition of commitment to the polity, following Walzer.60 However, the 
analysis will begin with the requirement for adulthood.61  
The requirement for adulthood is a rule concerned with competence based on 
maturity. Given that political choice is a matter of some sophistication, it is reasonable 
for a polity to restrict the vote to those deemed to have developed basic intellectual and 
emotional capacities, and age is a good generalised and impartial indicator of the 
required maturity.62 Since 1968 an elector in the UK must have attained the age of 18 
years before s/he is able to cast a ballot.63 Though the exact age to indicate the required 
maturity is perhaps contestable, and some mature minors might feel unjustly excluded 
from the ballot, there is clearly an organisational imperative to draw the line 
somewhere, and 18 is a perfectly reasonable choice shared by many democracies.64 That 
personation by those who are under 18 is wrongful is therefore judged uncontroversial.    
 It is arguable that sufficient age is not a guarantee of the required competence to 
make an informed political choice and for this reason electoral jurisdictions might 
concern themselves with questions of mental capacity tout court. However readers may 
be surprised to learn that UK electoral law contains, with a limited exception,65 no 
barriers on this basis. Previously at common law a person suffering from severe mental 
                                                          
60 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: a Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford; Blackwell, 1982), ch. 2. 
61 It should be noted that the election law of the United Kingdom does not contain a simple statutory 
statement of the breadth of the franchises. This is because, problematically, UK electoral law, or more 
properly laws, is/are to be found in a complex set of common law rules and statutory provisions dating 
back to the nineteenth century, if not before. The reader is advised to consult P. Gribble (ed.), Schofield’s 
Election Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd edition and updates) for a full account.  
62 Christiano, above n. 29, p. 128 where the notion of basic standard of minimal moral competence is 
defended, but no barriers beyond that.  
63 See Family Law Reform Act, s. 1 (1968) and RPA, ss. 1(1)(d) and 2(1)(d) (1983). 
64 The Chartsbin representation compiled from CIA and Inter-Parliamentary Union data reveals that the 
most common age for gaining the franchise is 18 years: see http://chartsbin.com/view/re6 (last visited 17 
February 2014).  
65 RPA 1983, s. 3A governs this exception, which is generally concerned with a person who, on 
conviction, is forcibly detained in a mental hospital. She is deprived of her vote under provisions 
analogous to those which deprive convicted prisoners of their vote.   
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illness could not vote.66 However, this common law rule was removed by the Electoral 
Administration Act s. 73 (2006) and the Mental Capacity Act s. 29 (2005); these two 
provisions are to the effect that the only person who may make the decision on whether 
a person has the capacity to vote is the voter herself. The UK’s failure to refuse the vote 
to adults due to lack of mental capacity means that there are no controversial exclusions 
on this basis.67 
It has been suggested that being subject to the rules of the polity as the measure for 
inclusion in the franchise should be narrowed by a further principle requiring 
commitment to the polity. Given the overwhelming empirical challenge of ascertaining 
such a psychological attitude in all cases, commitment needs to be assumed from 
general factors that bear a rough empirical link to such commitment. In the UK that 
commitment is assumed from a combination of two factors: citizenship and residence.  
Where citizenship is concerned, the UK rules are very generous. British citizenship 
through birth is, subject to the residence requirements addressed below,68 sufficient for 
inclusion in the franchise.69 However, it is not necessary, since citizens of the Irish 
Republic and of the Commonwealth may also vote in elections to the Westminster 
Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies and also 
                                                          
66 Schofield’s Election Law cites the Bedford County and Burgess cases 2 Lud EC 381 (1785) and the 
Oakhampton and Robin’s cases 1 Fras 69 (1791) as authorities for this proposition.   
67 M. Redley, J. C. Hughes and A. Holland, “Voting and Mental Capacity”, British Medical Journal 341 
(2010): p. c4085 argue in favour of the view that people with questionable mental capacity should not be 
prevented from voting that “voting is a political right, not a matter of competence to make decisions”. 
Compare this with the (Australian) Commonwealth Elections Act, s. 93(8)(a) (1918) which 
disenfranchises a person not of “sound mind who is incapable of understanding the nature and 
significance of … voting”. A full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of the present article. 
68 There are some voters who escape both the principle about being subject to the rules of the polity and 
the rule about being resident because, in these cases, citizenship is enough by itself.  Members of the 
Crown Services (military and civil) in service overseas are entitled to vote because there are service 
registration provisions to this effect: see RPA, ss. 14-17 (1983).  Expatriates may vote in national 
elections and referendums provided they have been registered in respect of a UK address within the last 
15 years: the Representation of the People Act, ss. 1 to 4 (1985) as amended provide the fundamental 
provisions. 
69 Birth or, more accurately, citizenship by virtue of birth, may be seen as another form of inherited 
property and thus indistinguishable from wealth in terms of the arbitrariness of its bestowal; see A. 
Shachar and R. Hirschl, “Citizenship as Inherited Property”, Political Theory 35 (2007): pp 253-287.   
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in local government elections. These last two groups, which may number over a million 
voters satisfying the residency requirements, may vote because of their former status as 
citizens of the British Empire. This rule was introduced without a great deal of debate 
by the Representation of the People Act 1918 because no distinction could or should 
have been made between subjects of the British Empire, who all had the right to travel 
freely in the Empire. This inclusive position has been maintained in subsequent 
legislation governing eligibility.70  
As for residence, where local government elections are concerned, such 
commitment can be assumed from residence because the locally resident, directly 
affected by local decisions, have, as a result, a direct interest in local governance. It is 
arguably that interest that explains why the citizenship requirements outlined above are 
expanded to include locally resident EU citizens.71 Where general elections are 
concerned, given the principle of OPOV and a system of electoral districts, it seems 
reasonable that residence should govern for which constituency your vote is counted, 
and can therefore be justified as a simple administrative device for deciding how to 
count votes in national elections. Personation to overcome these residency rules is 
therefore wrongful.  
In light of these rules, certain persons are excluded by dint of citizenship alone. Is it 
just that a citizen of France who has lived and worked in London for twenty-five years 
should not be entitled to vote for a member of the Westminster Parliament? She would 
be subject to the laws of England and Wales and would be paying taxes, directly and 
indirectly, to HMRC. It is nevertheless suggested that there is a way to distinguish 
between our citizen of the UK and, at least in 1918, our citizen of the Empire, on the 
                                                          
70 See now RPA, s. 1 (1983) (Parliamentary) and S2 (Local Government) for the eligibility rules. 
71 RPA, s. 2(1)(c) (1983).  
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one hand, and our Frenchwoman, on the other.  Whilst Dahl points out the dangers of a 
group being able arbitrarily to exclude others distinguished by mere accident of birth, 
our hypothetical Frenchwoman is distinguished by more than that. If she has lived 
lawfully in Britain for more than five years she is able to become a citizen with full 
rights to vote.72  The reason she has not assumed the franchise is not because she has 
been (permanently) excluded, but because she has, ultimately, chosen to exclude 
herself. As Walzer points out, being, or becoming a citizen entails a commitment to live 
in a common way of life and, if a person freely chooses not to adopt a methodology to 
demonstrate that commonality, she cannot expect to benefit from one of the rights 
contingent upon membership. This explains why our hypothetical French citizen should 
be criminalised if she personates. She is usurping the rights of those whose commitment 
to some measure of a common way of life can be reasonably assumed or demonstrated 
through an active decision.     
The most important form of exclusion based on lack of commitment is the most 
contentious.73  A convicted prisoner during the time s/he is in prison may not register to 
vote and is not free to vote.74  As the Standard Note records this has been repeatedly 
affirmed as the law.75 Despite the fact that it has been the subject of adverse comment in 
the UN Human Rights Committee the UK Parliament is unwilling to consider any 
amendment to the law. The criticism in the ECtHR and the UNHRC has not been 
                                                          
72  See https://www.gov.uk/becoming-a-british-citizen for a helpful guide to the procedure. 
73  The most accessible account is to be found in the House of Commons Library Standard Note 
SN/PC/01764 “Prisoners’ Voting Rights” of 15 January 2014 available  as a PDF from  
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN01764/prisoners-voting-
rights (Site visited on 11 February 2014). 
74 RPA 1983, s. 3. Persons convicted of certain electoral offences are also denied the vote even if they are 
not imprisoned. Under RPA, s. 160 (1983), a person reported guilty of a “corrupt offence/practice” (such 
as personation or electoral bribery under RPA, s. 113 (1983)) is denied the vote for five years whilst a 
person guilty of a (lesser) “illegal offence/practice” (such as failing to provide a return of election 
expenses under RPA, s. 84 (1983)) is denied the vote for three years. This, it is suggested, uncontroversial 
measure derives its justification from the direct connection between the wrongdoing and the punishment - 
a person who cheats during elections might well be denied the right to vote.   
75  Most recently in R (on the application of Chester) v Sec. State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63. 
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directed towards the principle that prisoners should be denied the vote, but towards the 
breadth of that principle as it is applied in the UK. Many democracies deny prisoners 
the vote to some extent,76 but it has been suggested that the UK has gone outside the 
margin of appreciation of Article 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR77 by operating a 
blanket ban. 
The UK Parliament’s explanation of this position is that those who have shown 
themselves unwilling to be bound by the laws have lost the privilege to vote for 
lawmakers.  The problem with that position is that both Art 25 of the ICCPR and Article 
3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR view voting as a right which may only be denied on 
the strongest possible grounds, and not all offences for which imprisonment is the 
penalty are sufficient grounds.  However one can see within this unresolved situation 
indications of a desert-based morality.  The argument seems to be Walzer’s view that 
commitment to a society is more than a simple subjection to the laws and tax policies of 
a country; it is furthermore a psychological commitment to a common way of life.  If 
criminals have breached their commitment by committing an imprisonable offence, it is 
reasonable, though contestable, that they lose their vote for the duration of their 
imprisonment. As such, though this exclusion is contestable, it is sufficiently reasonable 
such as to make personation by such a prisoner wrongful in the sense of mala in se as 
explained above.   
 
Personation and Harm 
                                                          
76 See the (Australian) Commonwealth Elections Act 1918 s. 93(8)(b) and s. 93(8AA).  For the avoidance 
of doubt the text of the Commonwealth Elections Act 1918 does not date from that year, but was 
completely revised in 1984. See Watt n. 12 above at [2.10.2]. 
77 The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, 
under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature. 
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Establishing the wrongdoing involved in personation is a necessary first step in 
justifying its criminalisation. The next step in the justificatory process requires an 
exploration of personation’s relationship to harm.78 This exploration serves two 
purposes: first, establishing a link between personation and harm furnishes a good 
reason to criminalise it;79 second, such a link arguably ensures that its criminalisation 
does not violate the constraints on coercion emerging from political liberalism.80    
In order to understand the link between personation and harm it is necessary to 
understand that personation, as defined by RPA s. 60 (1983), is a harm-independent 
wrong that is to say its definition incorporates no harm. This is the case because 
personation is not wrong, in whole or in part, because it is harmful, but because, as 
explained above, it is incompatible with certain fundamental democratic principles.81 
Nevertheless individual or collective acts of personation can give rise to a number of 
direct harms, and this potential certainly lends some weight to the criminalisation of 
personation. By direct harms it is meant that a single instance of personation, or the 
collective effect of several instances, actively and directly sets back the interests of 
fellow voters and/or candidates.82 Perhaps the most salient example of such a setback is 
when a legitimate voter is personated and, as a result, turned away at the ballot box.83 
However, sufficiently widespread and organised personation can alter the result of an 
                                                          
78 Harm has been defined by Feinberg as a “thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.” Feinberg, 
n. 16. p. 33. 
79 Feinberg, ibid p. 26; Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, pp. 35-36 and p. 48. 
80 The liberal requirement for harm, sometimes known as the harm principle, seeks to prevent the 
criminalisation of behaviour purely upon the grounds of its moral wrongfulness by also requiring that the 
prohibited behaviour should either be harmful or that, should the behaviour not be criminalised, that 
would be harmful.  
81 Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, pp. 50-51, in particular p. 51: “...some actions are wrongs prior 
to, and not in virtue of, any harm...that they may cause.” 
82 See Feinberg n. 78 above. 
83 This occurred in the Aston and Bordesley Green elections and should not occur again because relevant 
laws have been amended. The particular circumstances in which this occurred are a little peculiar and 
limitations of space prevent an explanation in this article. Readers are directed to RPA (1983), Schedule 1 
Rule 40 as amended (itself over 1100 words) for an outline of the present procedure; see also n. 82 below 
for further detail.  
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election, thereby setting back the interest of both the candidate who would have won 
legitimately, and all voters who supported that candidate in the ballot box. However, 
these direct harms are not always caused by personation; indeed some instances of 
personation will cause no harm at all. An example would be where an eligible voter who 
has never voted in his life, and has no interest in taking part in the democratic process, 
has his vote personated by a zealot, himself ineligible to vote, who adds a vote to a 
10,000 vote majority. It might be argued that every act of personation, even that of the 
zealot in the example just given, dilutes the voting power of legitimate voters, but in the 
case of the zealot the harm is, at worst, de minimis.84  
Given that direct harms caused by personation may be relatively infrequent or de 
minimis, it might be thought that that the harm principle is not satisfied. However, the 
criminalisation of personation conclusively satisfies the harm principle not because of 
(the risk of) such direct harms, but because the failure to criminalise it would 
(eventually) result in serious social harm, in the form of damage to the public good of 
electoral integrity. This harm is indirect.85 It should be noted that the argument that 
follows relies on an empirical assumption: that the failure to criminalise personation 
would, eventually, significantly increase instances of personation. 
A public good has been defined by Raz as follows: 
 
                                                          
84 Arguably no dilution in fact takes place as the person personated, who had no intention to vote, 
nevertheless had a right to vote. However, there will be dilution, albeit de minimis, if the zealot 
personates in the name of a fictitious person.  
85 Simester and von Hirsch call indirect harms that are caused by the failure to criminalise “secondary, 
reactive harms” n. 14 above, pp. 47-50. Such harms are articulated by the following question: “What 
matters, in other words, is not the question, ‘is this act harmful?’ but, rather, ‘what if this act were always 
permitted?’” Simester and von Hirsch, n. 14 above, p. 48.  For an analysis of rape in terms of secondary 
reactive harms, see J. Gardner, “The Wrongness of Rape”, n. 2 above. For an analysis of bribery in terms 
of secondary reactive harms, see J. Horder, “Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing”, n. 2 above. 
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“[A good] that refers not to the sum of the good of individuals but to those goods 
which, in a certain community, serve the interest of people generally in a conflict-
free, non-exclusive, and non-excludable way”86 
 
Electoral integrity is such a good because it is a necessary component of a healthy 
democracy, and all members of society benefit from a healthy democracy in “a conflict-
free, non-exclusive, and non-excludable way”. In turn its public quality means that harm 
to electoral integrity takes the form of a general deterioration in the democratic culture 
of a given society, thus harming all voters equally given their collective interest in that 
democratic culture.  
Electoral integrity has many different features.87 One of these is that the extent of 
support for individual candidates and political parties is accurately represented by the 
results of elections.88 When personation is widespread in an electoral system, by means 
of either mass multiple voting or mass voting by the ineligible, the extent of that support 
is always misrepresented. When sufficiently widespread, electoral outcomes are altered 
as well, allowing those who orchestrate the personation to achieve, or to place into, 
power those who do not have the necessary support of the electorate. Indeed, organised 
personation may well allow those with little support to achieve power. This latter state 
of affairs is fatal to the democratic character of a given society.  
                                                          
86 J. Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994) p. 52. Raz also uses the terms “common” and “general” good. It is worth noting that in his 
“Rights and Politics”, Indiana Law Journal 71 (1995): pp. 27-44, Raz refers to “the common good of 
living under a democratic government”, p. 34. 
87 See generally S. Birch, Electoral Malpractice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), ch. 2: 
“Defining Electoral Integrity and Electoral Malpractice”. See also Pippa Norris, “The New Research 
Agenda Studying Electoral Integrity”, Electoral Studies 32 (2013): pp. 563-575. 
88 The article thereby adopts a conception of electoral integrity that, in this context at least, sees electoral 
integrity as reflecting the values of liberal democracy; to use the language of Norris, the values of 
“transparency, inclusiveness and participation”, ibid, p 569. 
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The above argument is general in nature. The following is a list of more precise 
harms widespread personation would cause. This list reveals that the public good of 
electoral integrity is instrumental to a number of specific public goods reflecting the 
democratic character of a given polity:89 
 
1. Widespread personation will create a generalised loss of confidence in the electoral 
system, in turn triggering a significant reduction in participation in elections. As a 
result, a large section of the adult population will disengage with a key feature of 
the political process.90 For many, this disengagement will blunt their political 
awareness, perhaps to the point of extinction. A vital resource for political 
argument and change will be lost.  
 
2. Faith in elections, and consequent public participation in elections, is instrumental 
to a culture of public debate of political issues, not least because politicians must 
persuade the public of the merits of their political platforms in order to influence 
voting. Such public debate is a good because it improves the quality of the 
exploration of political issues and the equity of decisions taken by those in power.91 
However, widespread personation means that, as influence is replaced by raw 
power, such debate becomes increasingly pointless, and is perceived as such. The 
                                                          
89 As such, personation may be considered a crime against the State: see Minnite, above n. 6, p 26.  
90 For empirical support for this claim see S. Birch, “Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter 
Turnout”, Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010): pp. 1601-1622. On loss of confidence in electoral 
fairness generally and participation, see S. Birch, “Electoral Institutions and Popular Confidence in 
Electoral Processes: A Cross-national Analysis”, Electoral Studies 27(2) (2008): 305-320. Voter 
abstention also increases the risk of one of the direct harms outlined earlier in the text, that of actually 
altering the result of an election, as noted by F. E. Lehoucq: “If rates of voter participation fall, then 
fabricating a handful of votes may be sufficient to retain power, a fact that opposition or regional parties 
may exploit as elections become more competitive.” Lehoucq, “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and 
Consequences”, Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): pp. 233-253. 
91 See Beitz, n 29 above, p. 113. 
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harmful result is that the diversity and quality of public debate, and the equity of 
decisions taken, will degenerate.92 
 
3. “[A] key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens.”93 Dahl has argued that there are two 
reasons why this is so: regular elections and political competition among parties.94 
Personation, by allowing politicians and/or groups and/or individual voters to 
pervert the competitive process by not persuading voters but simply usurping votes, 
means that the capacity of elections to maintain such responsiveness is severely 
blunted, perhaps to the point of extinction. As noted by Lehoucq, “to the extent that 
public officials can corrupt the electoral process, they are less accountable to the 
electorate.”95 Widespread personation therefore damages a key beneficial feature of 
the democratic process. 
 
4. The final harm is concerned with Dahl’s second reason why politicians remain 
responsive to the preferences of citizens: political competition. Widespread 
personation will result in a reduction in the range of political choices available to 
the electorate, through the erosion of certain political parties. Widespread and 
systematic personation will mean that certain parties, not involved in the 
personation, will fade, lose resources and maybe disappear because, despite their 
appeal to certain sections of the population, they cannot influence the outcome of 
elections, or at least have the degree of their support expressed accurately in 
                                                          
92 See Beitz ibid p. 114. .    
93 Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 1.   
94 A Preface to Democratic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. 131-132.  
95 “Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization”, International Political 
Science Review 23 (2002): pp. 29-46, p. 35.  
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election results. Once such parties fade, or disappear, the electorate loses a 
mechanism whereby certain minority opinions can be expressed in the public arena, 
and thereby taken into account.96 In turn those groups that subscribe to those 
minority opinions may vanish, or at least have their interests consistently ignored, 
as the system no longer has politicians and parties who reflect, and therefore, voice 
their interests.97 
 
To summarise, the criminalisation of personation maintains and, equally importantly, 
publicly expresses a culture of electoral integrity and the need for and value of honest 
just and fair electoral processes. This may seem abstract and remote from reality but it is 
of fundamental socio-cultural concern. In turn, and linked to the idea of confidence in 
the electoral system, it is vital in maintaining a democratic culture of public 
involvement in political process. It is a significant democratic failure when voters 
decline to vote due to lack of confidence that the voting system will deliver a result in 
accordance with the wishes of the electorate, and the criminalisation of personation 
plays a key role in maintaining that confidence. 
 
Personation and the Civil Law 
Establishing that personation is a form of wrongdoing and that, if it became widespread, 
this would lead to harm, are important steps in justifying its criminalisation. 
Nevertheless there remain potential factors militating, perhaps decisively, against 
                                                          
96 Dahl has argued that democracy does not in fact lead to the tyranny of the majority but rather that the 
system of competition for votes, which Dahl calls “polyarchy”, encourages a proliferation of minorities 
whose interests must be taken into account by politicians: n. 94 above, p. 132.  For a discussion of Dahl’s 
argument, see D. Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 3rd ed., 2006), pp. 160-165.  
97 As Przeworski states: “Whoever ends up governing must consider the full distribution of preferences, 
including the fact that some people have extreme views. Hence, even if voting for minor candidates does 
not influence who governs, it may affect how they govern.” Przeworski, n. 47 above, p. 102   
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criminalisation. Some might argue that if personation can be contained by civil 
measures and administrative safeguards, there is no need for so powerful and personally 
destructive a tool as the criminal law. In other words, is the criminalisation of 
personation an example of the unnecessary use of the criminal law?98  
This article will argue not, on the basis that civil and administrative measures alone 
may not be able to prevent personation, and, where certain jurisdictions are concerned, 
it may be, in any event, undesirable to make the administrative procedures for voting 
too onerous or complex, for two reasons: first, because such measures may have a 
negative impact on participation;99 secondly, because they may have undesirable 
logistical and cost implications.100 Given these limitations where the civil law and its 
relevant procedures are concerned, this section of the article will argue that the criminal 
law can play a vital role in complementing and supplementing the civil law, by acting as 
a generalised deterrent against personation.101 It will, once again, use the situation in the 
UK to illustrate this argument. The argument will begin with an exploration of how 
personation can and does take place, addressing both voting at the polling station and by 
post.  
Before proceeding, however, it is important to note that there are two paradigmatic 
mechanisms for personation. The first mechanism may be described as “inflating the 
                                                          
98 For an in depth analysis of such concerns, see D. Husak, Overcriminalization: the Limits of the Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
99 For conflicting views on this question, see Hans A. von Spakovsky, “Protecting the Integrity of the 
Election Process”, Election Law Journal 11 (1) (2012): pp 90-96 and Justin Levitt, “Election Deform: 
The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Reform”, Election Law Journal 11 (1) (2012): pp. 97-117.  See also 
T. S. James, “Fewer Costs, More Votes? United Kingdom Innovations in Election Administration 2000-
2007”, Election Law Journal 10 (1) (2011) pp. 37-51, especially at pp. 50-51. 
100 See Levitt, ibid, especially pp. 115-117. See also T. S. James, “The Spill-Over and Displacement Effects 
of Implementing Election Administration Reforms: Introducing Individual Electoral Registration in Britain”, 
Parliamentary Affairs (2014) 67 (2) 281-305. 
101 Ibid, p 115. 
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electoral roll” or, to use an expression in common usage, “roll-stuffing”.102 It involves 
registering people to vote who are either fictitious or dead, or, alternatively, ineligible 
for registration, for example for minors or transients who are made to look eligible by 
the alteration of a key characteristic. The registration of the bogus voter is the first step 
in this process and, where the registration process is relatively lax,103 it may be easily 
accomplished.104 Once such registration is in place, the personator can then either vote 
in person (i.e. at the polling station) or by post in the name of the bogus voter. The 
second mechanism is aptly described as “vote appropriation”, and consists of voting in 
the name of another real person who is eligible to vote. This can be done either 
consensually, for example through the voluntary handing over of the eligible voter’s 
voting card to another who then votes in person,105 or by stealth, for example a person 
stealing a postal ballot paper of an eligible voter so as to vote by post in her name.106 It 
should be noted that both mechanisms can be used by multiple voters and ineligible 
voters. Voting at the polling station and by post will now be examined in light of both 
paradigms.    
Vote appropriation at the polling station requires that a person present herself at the 
Presiding Officer’s desk and give the name and address of an eligible voter who is on 
the electoral roll and who has not yet voted.  A ballot paper will then be issued and the 
name on the electoral roll crossed off the Register as having voted.107 There is some risk 
                                                          
102 Roll-stuffing, which Commissioner Mawrey identified as an Australian term for “a traditional Irish 
fraud”, there known as “voting the graveyard”, i.e. putting the names of dead electors on the electoral roll: 
see Slough above n 9. at [123-126]. 
103 See the Slough petition ibid in general. The provision of false information connected with the 
registration of electors is criminalised by s 13D of the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
104 See Minnite, above n. 6, p. 32. 
105 As happened in the Nigel Kennedy incident: see n. 23 above.  
106 There is, of course, some overlap between these two types; the registration of a transient 
Commonwealth citizen by claiming that she is resident and then using her vote following her return home 
is an obvious example of the intermediate form 
107 Should the person personated appear later in the day she will be issued with a tendered (coloured pink) 
paper under Rule 40 of the Parliamentary Election Rules (or the law applicable to the election, which 
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with this process, since the impersonated person may have already voted or may be 
known to the polling staff. However it should be noted that, without the crime of 
personation, this risk means nothing more than the thwarting of the would-be 
personator.108 The criminal law makes the risk involve negative consequences beyond 
mere prevention: thus the criminal law and the administrative framework work in 
conjunction with each other, the criminal law serving to motivate all potential 
personators to comply with the democratic values underlying the voting process.  
Given the public and physical “one-by-one” nature of voting in person, and, where 
vote appropriation is concerned, the risks just outlined, it might be thought that the 
potential for widespread and strategic personation at the polling station, rather than 
limited and fragmented instances, is limited. Thus the harms flowing from widespread 
personation articulated above would perhaps not materialise. Stewart articulates this 
view in quoting the Electoral Commission as stating that “personation at polling stations 
is “necessarily a small-time business. It is also a risky business”.”109 However, this view 
seems unjustifiably optimistic where both vote appropriation and roll-stuffing are 
concerned. 
In the case of vote appropriation and local government elections, political parties 
are well aware that turnouts are low, often at the level of 15-20% of the eligible voters, 
and they often have good records of who does and does not vote. Since those political 
parties are also furnished with copies of the electoral registers, which give the full 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
varies according to the type of election: local government, European Parliament, Police and Crime 
Commissioner etc.) and her vote placed in the ballot box. The Returning Officer is obliged to report the 
number of tendered ballots counted and, it is to be presumed, if one of the candidates judges, because 
there is a large number of tendered papers, that the election was tainted by fraud, (s)he may decide to 
issue an election petition.     
108 If the would-be personator were thwarted prior to voting, then the appropriate charge would be 
attempted personation, in accordance with the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s. 1(1). 
109 See J. Stewart, “A Banana Republic? The Investigation into Electoral Fraud by the Birmingham 
Election Court”, Parliamentary Affairs 59 (2006): pp. 654-667,  especially pp. 663-664, where Stewart 
quotes the Electoral Commission in their report The Shape of Elections to Come. 
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names, addresses and poll numbers of voters, they could, quite plausibly, use supporters 
from inside or outside the relevant area to take the place of voters who chose not to 
vote.110 
Furthermore, roll-stuffing offers an alternative mechanism that enables mass 
personation even at the polling station. To illustrate, in Woking, following a strategic 
exercise in roll-stuffing whereby a number of fictitious voters were entered onto the 
electoral roll in respect of addresses controlled by the impugned candidate, some 22 
“votes-in-person” were identified as being the product of personation.111 One can easily 
imagine a situation where a number of households sympathetic to a candidate each 
registered one or more fictitious voters and then, on polling day, a coach party of 
personating voters could be brought in from some adjoining area, producing a large 
number of fraudulent votes. 
Where the postal vote is concerned, the introduction of the postal vote on demand 
means opportunities for mass and successful execution of both paradigms are great.112 
The postal vote on demand means any person who wishes to vote by post in a specific 
election or in elections can apply for, and receive, a postal vote. Where roll-stuffing is 
concerned, the postal ballot merely requires a would-be personator to apply for a postal 
                                                          
110 The electoral frauds committed in Birmingham, Slough, Woking and, it is alleged in the latest election 
petition, Tower Hamlets (which has been heard, but not yet decided), were largely carried out amongst 
communities of South Asian (especially Pakistani and Bangladeshi) origin. In such communities, cultural, 
familial and kinship ties are especially strong and many people are employed by businesses run by 
members of their own community. Sobolewska and her co-researchers have shown how, for a variety of 
reasons amongst which the tendency of immigrant groups to cohere, a lack of interest from mainstream 
political parties and social exclusion possibly inspired by racist motives, South Asian community politics 
are strong and may not readily conform to the democratic practices of the majority community. Religion 
(and the perception of threats against religion) may also play a significant role in the mobilisation of the 
South Asian (Muslim) politic; see M. Sobolewska, S. Wilks-Heeg, E. Hill and M. Borkowska 
Understanding electoral fraud vulnerabilities in Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin communities in 
England: A view of local political activists (Electoral Commission, London) 2015). 
111 See [9], [83-85], [100-107] 
112 Rendered lawful by the Representation of the People Act 2000 which implemented the provisions of 
the Howarth Report and which was brought into effect by the Representation of the People (England & 
Wales) Regulations 2001. For a brief history of postal voting on demand, which goes on to consider the 
amount of electoral fraud occasioned by it between 2001 and 2009 see  I. White, “Postal Voting and 
Electoral Fraud 2001-2009” Parliamentary Standard Note SN/PC/3667 14 March 2012. 
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vote in the names of, say, fictional or deceased persons, and none of the minor existing 
formalities prevent this.113 Then, when the ballot papers arrive, the personator can vote 
multiple times. Where vote appropriation is concerned, one particular method which 
became infamous in Aston and Bordesley Green is for a community elder (or a member 
of the family) to collect the postal voting form from a consenting eligible voter and then 
complete it on his or her behalf.114 There are few, if any, ways of systematically 
detecting fraud of this sort prior to an election.115 In view of these difficulties of 
detection during the voting process, the deterrent power of the criminal law reduces the 
risk of compromised elections occurring, and is therefore a vital compliment to the civil 
law of election procedures.  
The best modern example of widespread personation using postal votes is the 
Woking election petition.  It is particularly helpful because it arose following an attempt 
to “fix the holes” in RPA (1983) which were exemplified in the Birmingham and 
Slough petitions.116 In the Birmingham Petitions Richard Mawrey Q.C. identified some 
fourteen methods by which personation could be accomplished for example, a mixture 
of roll stuffing and vote appropriation.117 However he was at pains to point out that 
these identified methods “by no means exhausted the possible methods of postal vote 
                                                          
113 Though it is criminalised by s. 62A of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (inserted by s. 40 of the 
Electoral Administration Act 2006). 
114 See the Aston and Bordesley Green judgment at [91]. 
115 In Aston a “voting factory” of this kind was only discovered because, in a hotly contested election 
involving a number of parties trying to attract Muslim voters away from the Labour Party over the Iraq 
war, rumours reached the authorities. All parties were on notice that “dirty tricks” might be used to secure 
the vote and accordingly everyone was on their guard. See par. 82 of the judgment in which Mr Hemming 
(Deputy Leader of the Council) was judicially noted to have said that “The system invites fraud” and, in 
succeeding paragraphs Commissioner Mawrey’s investigation of the method with Philip Coppel Q.C. 
[149] sets out the factual basis for the particular concerns in Birmingham.  The political atmosphere in 
Birmingham at the time of the elections is set out in par. [217-227]. See, for some further explanation, the 
article by Sobolewska et al above n.110. 
116 In the Slough Petition Commissioner Mawrey had pointed out that the addition of section 62A to the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 only remedied one of the defects in the Act: see [110]. 
117 See par. [386-413] for a complete catalogue of the fourteen methods used. In this regard it is worth 
noting that most of the methods of corruption used in Aston and Bordesley Green amounted to vote 
appropriation. 
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rigging”.118  Furthermore it seems from a reading of Woking that he was by no means 
certain as to how the widespread personation there had been accomplished, not least 
because of the elaborate means which the candidate and his “agents” (whether formal 
Agent or election helpers) used in trying to cover up the fraud.119 The larger point being 
made by Commissioner Mawrey was that, whatever politically acceptable 
administrative means were introduced to control personation, the fraudsters will always 
find a way to circumvent those safeguards. 
In the Slough petition Commissioner Mawrey acknowledged one way in which 
personation could be significantly minimised.120 He noted the example of the French 
Presidential election of 2007, where there was both a requirement for personal 
registration of electors, achieved by attendance at the local Marie together with one’s 
identity card, and only “voting in person”.121 One might also think of Sweden, where 
personation is prevented by an elaborate system of voting in person; however, this is 
only possible because of the small size of the electorate, the relatively large number of 
polling stations and the fact that many of the voters are known to the polling station 
staff.122 No doubt these political choices, in the form of the abandonment of postal 
voting, the rigorous individual registration of voters, and the careful checking of voters 
at the polling booth, would have significant impact on the problem. However the price 
paid in any given jurisdiction of such measures might be very high, both in terms of cost 
and organisation, on the one hand, and/or voter participation, on the other; for these and 
                                                          
118 See Slough at [92]. 
119  See Woking at [97-99] where Mr Bashir’s assertion that he ran a “one-man campaign” was dismissed 
as “fanciful” and reference was made to the involvement of his extended family and his network of 
business associates.  
120  [349]. 
121 There was, nevertheless, an 85% turnout of voters. 
122 See the OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report of 9-10 June 2010 in preparation for the 
Sept. 19th 2010 General Election available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/70947 (Visited 11th 
February 2014).   
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similar reasons, such measures might be deemed unacceptable.123 Furthermore, where 
vote appropriation is concerned they may still not be effective because, if a person is 
willing to hand over their vote, they are equally likely to hand over any checking or 
comparison documents. Even voting in person is susceptible to the substitution of close 
family members for the authentic voter. Thus the general deterrent effect of the criminal 
law will still be needed. 
The individual voter registration that has now been introduced by the Electoral 
Registration and Administration Act 2013 has the potential to reduce many of the 
opportunities for roll stuffing because it will make the registration process more 
rigorous, though the Act has loopholes which may be exploited.124 However, as 
discussed throughout this article, there is a danger with more rigorous registration 
requirements, as argued by James. He has pointed out that the likely effect of the 
Electoral Registration and Administration Act 2013 is to reduce the number of bona fide 
voters registering to vote.125 If everyone has to fill in their own electoral registration 
form in the canvass rather than relying upon some person in the household charged by 
the form with a sense of civic and legal responsibility, it is likely that those who are not 
                                                          
123 One of the present authors (Watt) takes the view that postal voting should be abandoned, but 
recognises that this is politically unlikely in the UK. He has also proposed to the Law Commission in his 
response to  its  latest Consultation (above n. 4) that extra polling stations be provided and that the special 
provisions in Northern Ireland (as an example of an area in which voting fraud was formerly widespread) 
that allow for the establishment of Special Polling Stations under Schedule 1 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1985 be extended to all areas of the UK, so that they may be used where there is an 
appreciable risk of widespread or organised fraud. 
124 The Act has introduced a new form of electoral registration known as Individual Electoral Registration 
(or IER) which replaces household registration and is supposed to make fraud more difficult. Under Part 1 
of the Act (and in particular ss 1 and 2) individuals wishing to register to vote must provide their name, 
address, date of birth and National Insurance (NI) number (a number provided by the state which 
facilitates the collection of tax through the payroll) in order to register. The NI number is then cross-
checked against a government database. However the safeguards provided by this system may be illusory.   
In a private demonstration to the Electoral Commission, one of the authors was able to register his family 
members without their knowledge or permission. Furthermore, and of much greater concern, is the fact 
that NI numbers and dates of birth are supplied to employers. Employers could subvert that information in 
order to register electors in their workforce or to ‘import’ electors from their own family or kinship 
groups in an adjacent area.  
125 See T. S. James, n. 100 above.   
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strongly committed to voting will simply fail to complete the form. Commissioner 
Mawrey in his judgment in the Birmingham cases noted that many people treat voting 
forms as “just another meaningless piece of paper from the council and bin it”.126 It is 
much more likely that this will occur when everyone in the house is sent an individual 
form because it may simply seem to be wasteful duplication to those who are turned off 
from the political process. The drop in actual registrations forecast by James will also 
arguably amplify the effect of personation because, if the number of real voters falls, the 
proportionate effect of fraudulent votes will be so much greater. 
The above illustrates the importance of criminalising personation on a practical 
level.  The dangers of personation have been demonstrated in this article and the 
election petitions from the UK demonstrate that there is a desire amongst some 
candidates and some sections of the electorate to secure election for their chosen 
candidate at any cost. Furthermore it is clear that those willing to cheat are prepared to 
use a variety of methods to inflate the electoral register or to obtain ballot papers. These 
are, no doubt, serious enough matters to warrant criminalisation because, as 
Commissioner Mawrey has discovered, the methods employed are always at least one 
step ahead of the electoral officials. Furthermore, on those occasions when, for a variety 
of reasons, the use of the civil law to prevent personation is undesirable, the 
criminalisation of personation can play a vital role in deterring those who otherwise 
might personate.  
Finally, a sceptic opposed to further extension of the criminal law might look at the 
two Birmingham election petitions, the Slough petition and the Woking petition and 
suggest that the petition procedure itself is sufficient to curtail personation. However, it 
is not because, whilst it offers a mechanism to remove from power those guilty of 
                                                          
126 See par. [42]. 
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organising systematic personation, it does not, of itself, prevent them from trying again 
or provide deterrence. Furthermore it is cumbersome, premised upon the need for a 
private party (such as a disappointed political rival) to initiate action at some expense, 
and subject to very onerous nineteenth century procedural rules.127 The criminal law and 
criminalisation, on the other hand, focuses upon the corrupters of an election and 
socialises the burden of deterring personation, placing the operational work upon the 
police, the CPS, the courts and, ultimately, the prison service to ensure electoral 
integrity.128 These are public bodies and, as such, they act as antibodies of the state 
protecting the body politic.  
 
 
Pure Personation 
Having hopefully justified the criminalisation of personation, attention must now turn to 
pure personation. As indicated at the outset of this article, pure personation takes place 
when a person votes as another person, as opposed to under another name, without 
voting as himself or, alternatively, votes as another with the other’s permission, but the 
procedure for obtaining a proxy or voting by post is not followed. Examples of the first 
instance, Type 1, include an eligible voter who does not vote as herself but rather votes 
as either another eligible voter who she knows is too lazy to vote, or, alternatively, votes 
as her dead father, who might remain for some months upon the electoral roll. The 
second instance, Type 2, is exemplified by the high profile case involving Nigel 
Kennedy, where a friend of Kennedy’s, at Kennedy’s request, voted as Kennedy’s 
absent wife for the candidate she wished to vote for, in the absence of a proxy or 
                                                          
127 Representation of the People Act Part III (1983). 
128 Personation is an imprisonable offence, with a maximum term of up to two years: RPA, s. 168(1) (a)(i) 
(1983).  
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Kennedy’s wife applying for a postal vote.129 Arguably Type 1 is a rather eccentric and 
pointless piece of behaviour and, for this reason, highly unlikely to take place; Type 2 is 
certainly understandable, as the example of the Kennedy case reveals. 
The label pure personator has been chosen for both instances because there is a sense 
in which no illegitimate vote has been cast. With Type 1, this is because the personator 
would be perfectly entitle to vote as himself; with Type 2, this is because the person 
granting permission would be entitled to vote and could have done so by post or, had a 
proxy been appointed, the personator would have been entitled to cast the vote. Thus 
arguably no wrongdoing has occurred nor harm done: we are concerned here with mala 
prohibita of the purest kind, since what is being enforced might seem, at first blush, to 
be a petty bureaucratic insistence either on voting as yourself or going through a 
somewhat laborious and arguably unnecessary process of completing a proxy or 
applying for a postal vote.130 
It is submitted that criminalisation is nevertheless justified for both Types, as 
instances where safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process can justify insisting 
on certain administrative procedures designed to guarantee that integrity.131 This is 
because the detection of personation in all its forms often requires that the votes cast are 
subjected to a ‘scrutiny’.132 This process involves opening the sealed bundles of votes 
                                                          
129 See n 23 above for details of the Kennedy case.  
130 Some may believe Type 1 involves wrongdoing and harm if the eligible voter who is personated is 
subsequently turned away at the ballot box. However, this cannot happen because Rule 40 of Schedule 1 
to the Representation of the People Act 1983 provides that a person who claims to be a voter 
disenfranchised in this way should be issued with a Tendered Ballot Paper.  This paper is packaged 
separately from the other papers and, if it is subsequently shown that s/he has been personated, the false 
vote is substituted.  
131 That criminal wrongs can legitimately be carved out of such an objective is articulated by Duff: see his 
173. 
132 Scrutiny is a common law process undefined by statute as it dates from the period between Ashby v 
White (as reported in (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938 as supplemented  by (1703) 1 Brown 62) and the 
Parliamentary Elections Act 1868, during which Petitions relating to Parliamentary elections were 
debated on the floor of the House of Commons. The full story of the controversial case of Ashby is 
recounted by Watt UK Election Law: A Critical Examination (London; Glasshouse 2006) 155, 196. 
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and comparing them with the marked register of electors (i.e. those who have voted) and 
ensuring that each voter is properly qualified.133 Scrutiny is a lengthy, difficult and 
expensive process, and the distraction and disruption caused by either type of 
personation should not be underestimated, as will now be explained.   
The process of scrutiny involves the positive identification on paper of each and 
every voter.  When a person goes into a polling station and applies for a vote s/he is 
checked off on the electoral register as an eligible voter (whether or not s/he is voting in 
the correct name).  The person giving that name is then issued with a securely number 
ballot paper which is recorded as having been issued in their name.  The ballot paper is 
marked and placed in the box. After counting , which is done in such a way as to render 
the number on the ballot paper invisible, the ballot papers and the registers marked with 
the name and number of the ballot paper are sealed separately and may only be 
recombined by order of an Election Court in a scrutiny process.  In the scrutiny the 
names and numbers are combined so it is possible to see how each person voted.  The 
scrutiny is attended by representatives of the parties to the Petition and, whilst it may 
seem unlikely, they may be able to challenge a particular vote.  This was certainly 
threatened in the case of Sanders v Chichester where it was alleged that some voters had 
voted for a candidate other than their favoured candidate by mistake.134 They had 
allegedly been confused when a candidate styling himself the ‘Literal Democrat’ had 
entered the contest with the intention of depriving the bona fide ‘Liberal Democrat’ 
candidate of votes.  If the Petition had not been settled on alternative legal grounds (that 
misdescription was not an offence in any event) the petitioners intended to call 
witnesses to say that they had been duped.  The scrutiny may thus reveal that ‘innocent’ 
                                                          
133 See the Woking Petition para. 6, revealing a number of improper votes detected on scrutiny.   
134 QBD Election Court, The Times 2 December 1994. 
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personation had taken place, which would take up time and money to resolve and might 
distract attention away from those who had personated in order to corrupt the election.   
There is also a ‘slippery slope’ argument here.  If the state allowed the personation of 
the dead father, why not of the sick father, or the absent father’, or the lazy father? All 
three have the option of taking part in the poll by means of a postal vote or by means of 
a proxy.135 So it is not that the person is disenfranchised by illness, absence or sloth, but 
simply that they are required to take part in a regulated process so as to facilitate the 
apprehension of offenders. The pure personator, such as Mrs Kennedy’s friend 
described above, risks providing a (perhaps unwitting) smokescreen for those who seek 
to act in an illegal way.  
It is accepted that where it is unequivocally shown that the personation is pure in 
nature, punishment by means of a summary fine might be appropriate.136 However there 
is a countervailing argument. The problem is, of course, that in the absence of 
criminalisation of ‘pure personation’ or where it is punished by means of a small fine,  
personation gangs such as those acting in Aston and Bordesley Green might find it 
convenient to  arrange for their supporters to form personation rings  so as to distract 
attention from real wrongdoing.  Accordingly, whilst it will never be possible to stop 
the isolated pure personator there are circumstances in which, rather than simply being 
amusing, convenient, or harmless, the pure personator can amount to a menace.  
 
Conclusion 
The principal aims of this article were two-fold: to reveal the nature of the wrongdoing 
involved in personation and to demonstrate how the failure to criminalise personation is 
                                                          
135 See Schedule 4 to the Representation of the People Act 2000. 
136 RPA, s. 168(1)(a)(i) allows for punishment by fine alone. In such cases, the offence would be minor: see 
Duff above n 131, 173. 
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harmful, potentially fatally, to the democratic character of a given polity. If successfully 
orchestrated, personation allows elections to act as vehicles for family, business, or 
other sectarian interests, as opposed to those elections reflecting the will of the 
electorate as a whole. This shrinking of the political landscape through the perversion of 
the democratic process harms the public good of electoral integrity in the ways outlined 
in this article, thereby harming society as a whole. 
The recent Elections Petitions examined in this article demonstrate that personation 
continues to be a viable and potentially effective form of electoral fraud. For as long as 
there remain effective ways to overcome procedural safeguards against personation, the 
criminalisation of personation will continue to serve a vital role in the defence of 
democracy. 
 
